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Abstract—Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) play an im-
portant role in identifying malicious attacks and threats in
networking systems. As fundamental tools of IDSs, learning
based classification methods have been widely employed. When
it comes to detecting network intrusions in small sample sizes
(e.g., emerging intrusions), the limited number and imbalanced
proportion of training samples usually cause significant chal-
lenges in training supervised and semi-supervised classifiers. In
this paper, we propose a general network intrusion detection
framework to address the challenges of both data scarcity and data
imbalance. The novelty of the proposed framework focuses on
incorporating deep adversarial learning with statistical learning
and exploiting learning based data augmentation. Given a small
set of network intrusion samples, it first derives a Poisson-Gamma
joint probabilistic generative model to generate synthesised
intrusion data using Monte Carlo methods. Those synthesised
data are then augmented by deep generative neural networks
through adversarial learning. Finally, it adopts the augmented
intrusion data to train supervised models for detecting network
intrusions. Comprehensive experimental validations on KDD Cup
99 dataset show that the proposed framework outperforms the
existing learning based IDSs in terms of improved accuracy,
precision, recall, and F1-score.
Index Terms—Network intrusion detection, data augmentation,
probabilistic generative model, generative neural networks, deep
adversarial learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
NETWORK intrusion detection (NID) has been one ofthe key components towards network security in the
past decades [1], [2], [3]. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
play a significant role in NID for deterring cyber attacks
and threats coming from a vast number of network-connected
devices (e.g., computing systems [4] [5], sensor networks [6]
[7] and software defined networks [8]). With the increasing
usage of networking systems and frequent emergence of varied
intrusion attacks, new generation of high performance IDSs
needs to be developed for accurately detecting not only a
series of high-frequency network intrusions, such as neptune
and smurf attacks, but also intrusions (e.g., mailbomb and
snmpguess attacks) that have limited known records.
IDSs can be generally categorized into two categories.
The first group focus on patterns/signatures of network pack-
ets/traffic. Those systems identify network intrusions using
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rule-based matching [9], [10]. The second group apply ma-
chine learning (ML) based approaches such as supervised
and/or semi-supervised learning and train NID models on a
collection of labeled and/or unlabeled network data. Those
learning based IDSs are reported to have high detection rate
and fast processing speed [3]. They are gaining increased
significance alongside with the surge of network traffic and
heterogenous types of network attacks. The performance of
learning based IDSs [11] [12] has significant dependence on
network data features and the choice of relevant classifiers
(e.g., support vector machine (SVM), and logistic regression
(LR)) which are obtained in a data-driven manner. In this case,
the defects, such as feature redundance and data imbalance, of
the training set become the bottleneck of developing accurate
IDSs [3] [13].
In the past decade, deep learning (DL) models, e.g., deep
neural networks (DNNs), have revolutionized classical ML on
supervised classification tasks [14] [15]. In the community of
network security, DL based IDSs [3] [8] show advanced NID
performance because hierarchically structured DNNs extract
representative features of network data. Unfortunately, the
weights of DNNs need to be optimized on a large dataset.
Therefore, DL based IDSs cannot accurately detect network
intrusions if the related training data are insufficient and
imbalanced [3].
The challenges encountered in learning based IDSs can be
formulated as data scarcity and data imbalance. One highly
potential solution of those problems is to increase the number
of related data samples in the training set. However, labeling
large datasets is expensive, time-consuming, and sometimes
impossible due to emerging and fast evolving intrusion attacks.
In addition, adequate records of different types of intrusions
might be unavailable, which makes those problems particularly
severe. Thus, developing a data augmentation (DA) enhanced
NID framework is crucial for network security.
To tackle the aforementioned challenges, this paper presents
a novel NID framework that is able to utilize supervised clas-
sification models for identifying normal network requests and
high-frequency cyber attacks. More importantly, we propose
a DA module that incorporates deep adversarial learning and
statistical learning techniques, which allows the NID frame-
work to detect network intrusions in small sample scenarios.
Experimental results on KDD Cup 99 dataset [16] show that it
can effectively identify intrusions, in particular, the emerging
ones when limited training data are provided.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
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2• We propose a general learning based NID framework
focusing on detecting network intrusion in small samples.
By exploiting DA and advanced classification methods, it
is capable of identifying a variety of network intrusions,
especially emerging ones.
• We develop a novel DA module that addresses the
scarcity and the imbalance of training set via a data-
driven manner. It involves a probabilistic generative
model for estimating network data feature distributions
and generating synthesised data using Monte Carlo meth-
ods. Furthermore, we pre-train and fine-tune deep gener-
ative neural networks in adversarial learning scheme for
augmenting synthesised intrusion data with high quality.
• Extensive experiments on classifying small sample in-
trusions and normal network requests are performed.
Compared with the existing learning based IDSs, the
DA enhanced NID framework achieves the better or
comparable accuracy, precision, recall and F1-score.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II introduces related works and motivations. Section III
presents the proposed NID framework and learning based
DA module. Section IV reports the evaluation, analysis, and
comparison of experimental results. Section V provides further
discussions of our work. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first introduce recent progresses in
learning based IDSs. We then present the preliminaries of DA
methods and the motivations of this paper.
A. Learning based Network Intrusion Detection
Existing learning based IDSs utilize ML and DL models
for distinguishing different types of network data. In the
category of recent ML based IDSs, Zhang et al. [11] combined
unsupervised clustering and supervised learning for robust
network traffic classification. Ashfaq et al. [17] proposed
semi-supervised fuzzy method for intrusion detection. Those
methods establish NID models by learning knowledge from
a large amount of unlabeled network data. Howbeit, the
performance of their methods in detecting intrusions with
small sample sizes remains unknown if abundant data are
unavailable. Apart from those methods, supervised classifica-
tion models such as LR, SVM, and random forest (RF) have
been extensively applied for improving modern IDSs [13] [18]
[12]. To deal with the feature redundancy problem in training
supervised classifiers, Ambusaidi et al. [13] introduced mutual
information based algorithm to select network features. Zhou
et al. [18] adopted word embedding for extracting meaningful
features of network data. In order to further alleviate the over-
fitting problem, RF [12] and tree algorithms [19] have been
employed to ensemble sub-classification models for robust
NID. However, the data scarcity and data imbalance remain
unsolved because the feature selection/extraction and classifier
aggregation do not increase the number of intrusion samples
among different categories in the training set.
In DL based IDSs, Tang et al. [8] applied three-layer DNN
for extracting multilevel features and classifying flow-based
network intrusions. Shone et al. [3] proposed a more complex
DNN called nonsymmetric deep auto-encoder (NDAE). They
stacked two NDAEs for unsupervised feature learning of
network data, followed by a RF for classification. Those DNN
based IDSs achieve promising NID performance in terms
of different evaluation metrics (e.g., accuracy, precision and
recall). Considering the requirement of large quantities of
training data for optimizing the layer weights of DNNs, the
weakness of those IDSs in detecting low-frequency intrusions
(e.g., the guesspasswd and the bufferoverflow attack
reported in [3]) is non-negligible. Thus, enriching small sam-
ple intrusions in the training set is essential in developing
learning based IDSs.
B. Data Augmentation Methods
1) Probabilistic Generative Models: In Bayesian statistical
learning, probabilistic generative models are extensively used
to approximate unknown distributions of target data [20].
Therein Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are
used to sample their parameters from observed data.
The Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm [21] is the foun-
dation of MCMC, which generates candidate data from a
proposal distribution based on an acceptance probability. An
improved version to MH algorithm is Gibbs sampling [22]
[23] which uses a full conditional distribution for designing
the proposal distribution. Closely related to Gibbs sampling,
expectation maximisation (EM) algorithm [24] [20] alternates
between an expectation step and a maximization step for esti-
mating distribution parameters. Nonetheless, those algorithms
cannot be directly applied to generate intrusions due to the
difficulty of modeling complex features (e.g., real/Boolean
values) with large divergence.
2) Generative Adversarial Networks: Generative adversar-
ial networks (GANs) [25] have been increasingly employed in
generating realistic objects in computer vision [26] [27]. GANs
contain two differently structured DNNs: the discriminative
net and the generative net denoted as D and G, respectively.
During the stage of training, G attempts to produce forged
data based on input priority. D takes in both forged data and
real ones, and learns to distinguish the counterfeit from the
truth. This finally results in a powerful data generator G.
Note that both D and G are constructed of DNNs, therefore,
training GANs on a small collection of intrusion samples is a
challenge. Even if sufficient network intrusions are available,
GANs are reported to have remarkable training difficulties [28]
[29]. For instance, G gets worse while D gets better due to
the significant difference of convergence speed, which might
lead to poor outputs and a deficient generator.
C. Motivations
Despite promising progresses in recent research on learn-
ing based IDSs, challenges such as data scarcity and data
imbalance in training (semi-)supervised classifiers are still
two fundamental issues to the community. Those challenges
become vital with the increased emerging attacks that often
have limited known data samples. Data augmentation methods
provide a potential approach to tackle these problems, which
3Fig. 1. The proposed NID framework for detecting network intrusions in small sample sizes.
Fig. 2. The structure of DA module for augmenting network intrusions.
could enrich network data in the training set if designed prop-
erly. Findings obtained from the existing literatures show that
directly applying DA algorithms might bring undesired effects
[20] [29]. Hence, a novel learning based DA module associated
with the general NID framework presented in this paper will
contribute to the design of advanced high performance IDSs.
III. NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION WITH DATA
AUGMENTATION
In this section, we first introduce the pipeline of the pro-
posed NID framework and then present the formulation of
the learning based DA module for addressing data scarcity
and imbalance problems. Finally, we provide the detailed
optimization of DA module through adversarial learning.
A. The NID Framework
Figure 1 depicts the proposed NID framework that involves
the training phase for training supervised classification models
assisted with learning based DA module. Those classifiers
are then adopted in the testing phase for detecting network
intrusions from normal network requests.
In the training phase, continuous features of network data
are normalized and the related statistical variables (i.e., mean
and standard deviation) are recorded for processing testing
data. We make discrete symbolic features remain unchanged.
Other pre-processing techniques (e.g., data filtering and feature
selection) can be alternatively applied. Normalized data are
then partitioned, in which a proportion of normal network data
are randomly selected and the imbalanced network intrusion
samples are augmented by DA module. Finally, those data
are aggregated as a balanced dataset for training NID models
using supervised learning methods.
In the testing phase, input network data are pre-processed
as training data and fed into NID models for classification.
Because those models are trained on balanced dataset us-
ing advanced learning methods, the proposed framework is
competent to accurately identify network intrusions, especially
emerging ones.
B. The Data Augmentation Module
Figure 2 shows the schematic diagram of the proposed
DA module. Given a small number of network intrusion data
samples, the Poisson-Gamma joint probabilistic model (PGM)
is first derived for efficiently generating synthesised intrusion
data. Deep generative neural networks (DGNNs) then take
both real and synthesised data to train layer weights through
adversarial learning. Finally, DGNNs output network intrusion
data with augmented quality.
In DA module, PGM plays an essential role in initializing
DGNNs to fit in with the general distribution of related
intrusions. This alleviates the convergence problem of training
DGNNs on limited network data. In turn, DGNNs compensate
for the boundedness of PGM on simulating network features
that exhibit large divergence.
C. The Poisson-Gamma Joint Probabilistic Model
In this subsection, we present the Poisson-Gamma joint
probabilistic generative model for modeling feature distribu-
tions of network data. At the same time, we theoretically
analyze its feasibility for simulating complex network features.
Finally, we exploit MCMC based Gibbs sampler for efficiently
generating synthesised intrusion data.
Let x ∈ RK be the feature vector of one network intrusion
sample, where K denotes the dimension of feature space.
Assuming that intrusions of the same category come from the
joint probabilistic distribution defined as follows:
pM(x) = p(x|λ), (1)
where λ = {λ1, . . . ,λK}, and λi ∈ RQ denotes the distri-
bution parameters of i-th feature dimension of x. Note that
pM(x) contains K components, which means each feature of
x is jointly modeled by one distribution.
4In the existing NID benchmarks [16] [30], continuous digital
features of network data usually represent the volume of
requests or the time of connections. Consequently, Poisson
distribution [31] is employed to approximate the accumulation
of those network events:
Poisson(x;λ) = e−λ
λx
x!
, (2)
where λ indicates the average intensity, i.e., the statistical av-
erage, of x. Since Poisson distribution contains one parameter,
we have λi ∈ RQ and Q = 1.
To render an effective Markov chain for the subsequent data
simulation, λ is approximated by Gamma distribution:
Gamma(λ;a, b) =
1
Γ(a)
baλa−Iexp(−bλ), (3)
where a, b ∈ RK are shape and scale parameters. Given a
collection of M intrusion samples X ∈ RM×K , we have
a = [E(X)]2/V ar(X) and b = E(X)/V ar(X), where
E(X) and V ar(X) denote the expectation and variance ofX .
Because of the conjugated relationship between Poisson and
Gamma distribution [32], the convergence property of PGM
is theoretically guaranteed for synthesising network data.
Proposition 1. The Poisson-Gamma joint probabilistic model
can estimate the distributions of both continuous and discrete
digital features of network data.
Proof 1. The Poisson-Gamma joint distribution can approxi-
mately estimate continuous digital features distributions since
the accumulation of network events can be statistically formu-
lated by Poisson process.
For discrete digital features (i.e., values equals to 0 or 1),
the joint distribution can model those symbolic values by
sampling the Poisson parameter λi to be 0 or 1 from Gamma
distribution, respectively.
Providing intrusion samples X = {x(i)}Mi=1 of the same
category, the goal of synthesising intrusions then becomes to
estimate λ given X . According to Bayes’ theorem [33], this
can be achieved by maximizing the compact posterior:
p(λ|X) ∝ p(X|λ)p(λ), (4)
where the first and the second terms on the right side are
the density functions of Poisson and Gamma distributions,
respectively.
Proposition 2. If network intrusion samples are assumed to
obey Poisson distribution and their Poisson parameter λ is
formulated by Gamma distribution, then the posterior p(λ|X)
obeys Gamma distribution.
Proof 2. In Eq. (4), each term stands for a probability and
hence has a nonnegative value. Applying natural logarithm on
both sides in Eq. (4), we have:
logp(λ|X) ∝ log(
M∏
i=1
p(x(i)|λ)) + logp(λ), (5)
where i denotes the serial number of known intrusion samples.
Substituting the exponential form of Poisson and Gamma
density functions into Eq. (5), we obtain:
log(
M∏
i=1
p(x(i)|λ)) + logp(λ)
=
M∑
i=1
(x(i)logλ− λ− log(x(i)!))
+ (a− I)logλ− bλ− logΓ(a) + alogb,
(6)
where x! denotes the element-wise factorial of x and I ∈ RK
a unit vector.
Extracting the terms with respect to λ in Eq. (6), we derive
the representation of the posterior as follows:
logp(λ|X)
= C[
M∑
i=1
(x(i)logλ− λ) + (a− I)logλ− bλ]
= C[(a+
M∑
i=1
x(i) − I)logλ− (MI + b)λ]
= C[log Gamma(a+
M∑
i=1
x(i),MI + b)],
(7)
where C is a negligible constant [32]. All multiplications
above are operated in an element-wise manner. Therefore, the
posterior p(λ|X) obeys Gamma distribution.
Given a collection of network intrusion samples {x(i)}Mi=1,
we utilize Eq. (7) to approximate the Poisson parameter λ
and further synthesise intrusion data by Poisson using Gibbs
sampler. Algorithm 1 shows the pseudo-code of PGM for
producing synthesised intrusion data.
Algorithm 1 The Poisson-Gamma joint probabilistic model
Input: A set of real intrusion samples {x(i)}Mi=1, The number
of synthesised intrusion data N , The cut off threshold of
Gibbs sampler T .
Output: A set of synthesised intrusion data {y(j)}Nj=1.
1: Initialize n = 1;
2: for t = 1, . . . , N + T do
3: Sample λ(t) ∼ Gamma(; {x(i)}Mi=1,a, b) in Eq. (7);
4: if t > T then
5: Sample y(n) ∼ Poisson(;λ(t)) in Eq. (2);
6: n = n+ 1;
7: end if
8: end for
D. The Deep Generative Neural Networks
In this subsection, we present the formulation of DGNNs
that augments synthesised intrusion data with enhanced qual-
ity. Afterwards, we propose a two-fold mechanism for training
DGNNs via adversarial learning strategies.
The proposed DGNNs have two components: the Dis-
criminator (D-net) and the Generator (G-net). In adversarial
5(a) The pre-training process (forward-propagation).
(b) The fine-tuning process (forward-propagation).
Fig. 3. The schematic depiction of two-fold adversarial mechanism for
training DGNNs.
training process, G-net generates augmented intrusion data by
learning their real feature distribution, while D-net acts as an
indicator trying to reject augmented data from real intrusion
samples. By fully exploiting the capability of hierarchical
feature learning, D-net and G-net are implemented by DNNs.
The input size of D-net and G-net is K which equals to
the dimension of network data features. In the hidden layers,
neural nodes are stacked for abstracting latent representation
of input data. The output of D-net is a scalar which returns
the possibility whether its input comes from real samples.
In contrast, the output of G-net is a K-dimensional vector
representing the augmented network intrusion.
Provided with target network intrusion samples, the goal
of training DGNNs is to obtain a potent G-net that recovers
their feature distributions and further generates intrusion data
with similar characters. As discussed in Section II-B, training
DGNNs with limited samples is easy to over-fit because
both D-net and G-net are structured in DNNs. Therefore,
we present a two-fold adversarial learning mechanism which
adopts both real and synthesised network data for optimizing
their weights.
1) Pre-training: As shown in Figure 3(a), synthesised intru-
sion data Y = {y(j)}Nj=1 are treated as sub-optimal targets and
D-net is trained to distinguish augmented ones (i.e., G(Z))
from them. Variables Z = {z(j)}Nj=1 and z ∈ RK are the
prior of G-net for learning the mapping G(Z) → Y . To
adjust to different and unexpected situations, z is sampled
from Gaussian distribution N (0, 1). This assumes G-net has
no specific prior knowledge on targets. The objective of pre-
training is then formed as the following adversarial game:
minG maxD V (D,G)
= IEy∼pfake [logD(y)] + IEz∼pnoise [log(1−D(G(z)))],
(8)
where pfake and pnoise denote feature distributions of Y and
Z, respectively. Given sufficient synthesised data, DGNNs are
pre-trained to fit in with the general distribution of related
network intrusions [29]. In this case, the quality of augmented
samples is bound to be mediocre as G-net cannot directly
access the feature information of real intrusion samples.
2) Fine-tuning: During the adversarial training demon-
strated in Figure 3(b), D-net takes in both real intrusion
samples X = {x(i)}Mi=1 and augmented ones from G-net.
Meanwhile, G-net is fed by synthesised data added with
Gaussian variables (i.e., y + z). In this scenario, DGNNs are
fine-tuned according to the following objective:
minG maxD V (D,G)
= IEx∼preal [logD(x)]
+ IEy∼pfake,z∼pnoise [log(1−D(G(y + z)))],
(9)
where preal denotes the real intrusion distribution to recover.
Note that G(y+z) rather than G(y) or G(z) is chosen in fine-
tuning. This avoids G-net learning monotonous distribution
from the same data in Y = {y(j)}Nj=1.
Since DGNNs have been pre-trained on synthesised intru-
sion data, the Generator competes with the Discriminator on
a comparative level in fine-tuning stage. Thus, the two-fold
adversarial training mechanism allows DGNNs to learn real
intrusion distribution in a progressive manner. This precludes
the remarkable convergence difference of DGNNs, and pre-
vents the Generator generating poor outputs.
E. Optimization
In this section, we present the optimization details of pre-
training and fine-tuning DGNNs.
Let θd and θg denote the weights of D-net and G-net. The
aim of training DGNNs becomes to optimize the minmax
objectives in Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) with respect to θd and θg .
Considering that DGNNs are formed in DNNs, they are trained
by back-propagation with stochastic gradient algorithm.
In the pre-training stage, the gradients of V with respect to
θd and θg on a batch of L intrusion samples are:
∂V
∂θd
= ∇θd
1
L
L∑
l=1
[logD(y(l)) + log(1−D(G(z(l))))], (10)
∂V
∂θg
= ∇θg
1
L
L∑
l=1
[log(1−D(G(z(l))))]. (11)
In the fine-tuning stage, the gradients of V with respect to
θd and θg on a batch of L intrusion samples are:
6Algorithm 2 Pre-train and fine-tune DGNNs in adversarial
manner with stochastic gradient optimization for augmenting
synthesised network intrusion data
Input: Real intrusion samples {xi}Mi=1, Synthesised intrusion
data {yj}Nj=1, Gaussian random variables {zj}Nj=1, Mini-
batch size L, Maximum iteration Tpre-train and Tfine-tune.
Output: Optimized weights θd and θg of DGNNs.
1: for t = 1, 2, . . . , Tpre-train + Tfine-tune do
2: if t ≤ Tpre-train then
3: for kd steps do
4: Select L samples from {yj}Nj=1;
5: Select L samples from {zj}Nj=1;
6: Compute gradient ∇θd as Eq. (10);
7: Update θd by Adam.
8: end for
9: for kg steps do
10: Select L samples from {zj}Nj=1;
11: Compute gradient ∇θg as Eq. (11);
12: Update θg by Adam.
13: end for
14: else
15: for kd steps do
16: Select L real intrusions from {xi}Mi=1;
17: Select L samples from {yj}Nj=1;
18: Select L samples from {zj}Nj=1;
19: Compute gradient ∇θd as Eq. (12);
20: Update θd by Adam.
21: end for
22: for kg steps do
23: Select L samples from {yj}Nj=1;
24: Select L samples from {zj}Nj=1;
25: Compute gradient ∇θg as Eq. (13);
26: Update θg by Adam.
27: end for
28: end if
29: end for
∂V
∂θd
= ∇θd
1
L
L∑
l=1
[logD(x(l)) + log(1−D(G(y(l) + z(l))))],
(12)
∂V
∂θg
= ∇θg
1
L
L∑
l=1
[log(1−D(G(y(l) + z(l))))]. (13)
After obtaining gradients ∂V /∂θd and ∂V /∂θg , layer weights
θd and θg are optimized by stochastic gradient descent.
Algorithm 2 shows the pseudo-code of training DGNNs.
During the evolution of adversarial learning, we alternate
between kd = 8 steps of optimizing D-net and kg = 2 steps
of optimizing G-net. In each inner loop, the gradient descent
method Adam [34] is employed for updating θd and θg .
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we conduct comprehensive experimental
validations of the proposed DA enhanced NID framework on
TABLE I
KDD CUP 99 DATASET (NO. OF SAMPLES IN EACH CATEGORY)
Category Training (100%) Training (10%) Testing
NORMAL 972781 97278 60593
DOS 3883370 391458 229853
PROBE 41102 4107 4166
U2R 52 52 228
R2L 1126 1126 16189
TABLE II
NO. OF TRAINING SAMPLES IN THE SUBCATEGORIES THAT HAVE SEVERE
SCARCITY AND IMBALANCE PROBLEMS IN THE KDD CUP 99 DATASET
Category Intrusion Type Training (10%) Testing
DOS
’apache2’ 0 794
’mailbomb’ 0 5000
’processtable’ 0 759
PROBE ’mscan’ 0 1053
’saint’ 0 736
R2L
’guesspasswd’ 53 4367
’snmpgetattack’ 0 7741
’snmpguess’ 0 2406
KDD Cup 99 dataset [16]. Its performance on detecting the
network intrusions in small samples (e.g., emerging attacks)
is compared with learning based IDSs, in which classical LR,
SVM, and advanced DNN are employed for comparison.
A. Network Data
KDD Cup 99 dataset [16] is a benchmark dataset widely
used in NID study. As outlined in Table I, it is composed
of two training sets at different scales and one testing set.
Network data are categorized into normal requests (NOR-
MAL) and four major intrusions: denial-of-service (DOS),
surveillance and other probing (PROBE), unauthorized access
from a remote machine (R2L) and unauthorized access to root
user (U2R). Given that 100% training set merely contains
additional records of normal requests and high-frequency
intrusions, the 10% training set is used in all experiments.
Each record of KDD Cup 99 dataset consists of 38 digital
features and 4 character features. Assuming that the digital
features provide adequate information for identification, char-
acters are not used for experimental validation.
Considering the task of NID in small sample sizes, network
intrusions are expected to satisfy the prerequisites that they
have limited records in the training set, while plentiful records
exist in the testing set. In this case, 8 types of intrusions
are selected (as shown in Table II): apache2, mailbomb
and processtable of DOS attack, mscan and saint
of PROBE attack, guesspasswd, snmpgetattack and
snmpguess of R2L attack. In experiments, if no training data
in one intrusion type is available, M related testing intrusion
samples will be selected to complement the training set before
data augmentation. Those samples are then rejected for testing.
Despite training DNNs requires a large amount of labelled
data, M is set to 50 to meet the above prerequisites.
7B. Evaluation Metrics
The metrics that are used to measure NID results of IDSs
are listed below:
• True Positive (TP): Network intrusions (or normal net-
work requests) that are correctly detected.
• True Negative (TN): Normal network requests (or net-
work intrusions) that are correctly detected.
• False Positive (FP): Normal requests that are mis-
classified as intrusions.
• False Negative (FN): Intrusions that are mis-classified as
normal requests.
Then, the accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score [3] [8]
are computed to evaluate different IDSs, in which larger values
represent the better detection performance on network data.
C. Parameters
The detailed parameter setup and tuning strategies are
provided as follows:
1) Threshold of Gibbs sampler: The cut off threshold T is
set to be 500 to assure the convergence of PGM. Due to the
efficiency of Gibbs sampling, T can be a large value while
the time consuming is still economic.
2) Structure of DGNNs: In D-net, hidden nodes are set to
be 70, 50, 40, and 20. The ReLU activation function is used
after each non-terminal layer, while the the sigmoid activation
function is applied to the last layer for producing the decision
probability. In G-net, the layer nodes are set to be 40, 30, and
20. Those three hidden layers are sequentially connected by
ReLu and sigmoid functions. The last hidden layer is linearly
mapped to the output layer. In this scenario, G-net has less
hidden nodes than that of D-net, which leads to improved
inference capacity of D-net and guarantees an effective G-
net to be trained. In addition, dropout [35] is employed in
all hidden layers to regularize training process and decrease
over-fitting risks.
3) Mini-batch size of DGNNs: L is constrained to be less
than the minimum number of real and synthesised intrusion
data (i.e., L < min{M,N}). In our experiments, L is set to
be 20% ∼ 40% of real intrusion samples (i.e., L = 15). This
allows training DGNNs to be efficiently and effectively.
4) Training iterations of DGNNs: The maximum iterations
in pre-training stage and fine-tuning stage are empirically set to
be Tpre-train = 3000 and Tfine-tune = 300. Since known network
intrusions are limited, less iterations in fine-tuning stage are
suggested to avoid over-fitting problem.
5) Other hyper-parameters of DGNNs: The learning rates
of D-net and G-net are both empirically set to be 2×10−4 for
the propose of adjusting weights of DNNs with respect to low
ratio of loss gradients. This guarantees DNNs to be robustly
trained and avoids missing optimum. Howbeit, it might result
in low convergence speed. Thus, momentum [36] is adopted
to accelerate training and prevent gradient oscillations. The
parameters in momentum are defaultly set to be 0.9 and 0.99
when Adam optimizer is used [34].
D. Binary Classification based NID
In this subsection, we evaluate binary classification perfor-
mance of the DA enhanced NID framework. In each group
of the experiments, it is required to identify positive samples
(i.e., one type of network intrusions) from negative samples
(i.e., normal network requests).
As illustrated in Fig. 1, a proportion of 6,000 randomly
selected normal request data and 50 intrusion samples (aug-
mented to 500 by the DA module) are used for training ML
based NID models. In this case, LR and SVM are adopted
since they are basic building blocks of many learning based
IDSs [13] [3].
The training and testing procedures are repeated 15 times,
each with varying selected negative samples and rejecting
anomalous results. Afterwards, the statistic average of eval-
uation metrics are computed for validation. In this scenario,
the adverse impact of data imbalance (i.e., training with all
negative samples) is further reduced. Besides, it avoids training
classifiers with biased data, such that the selected negative data
are not representative.
Table III summarizes the binary classification results. It
demonstrates that the DA enhanced NID frameworks (named
as NID-DA-LR/SVM) achieve improved or comparable recall,
and significantly outperforms other IDSs (named as NID-
LR/SVM) in terms of precision and F1-score. Those results
show that the intrusions augmented by the proposed DA
module can be used to train potent classification models for
NID tasks.
Note that the proposed frameworks obtain improved accu-
racy on most intrusion types except snmpgetattack attack
and snmpguess attack of R2L. The reasons are two aspects.
Firstly, computing accuracy requires to count normal network
requests which occupy a large proportion in the testing set (see
Table I and II). Thus, accuracy merely increases in small mar-
gin when additional intrusions are detected. Secondly, the low
precision and recall of NID-LR/SVM on snmpgetattack
and snmpguess attacks indicate that considerable intrusions
are misclassified. Accordingly, they are not applicable to detect
intrusions in the small sample scenario.
E. Multiple Classification based NID
In order to verify the performance of the DA module
on enhancing the existing learning based IDSs, we have
undertaken multi-class based NID experiments. In this case,
the network data are categorized as: NORMAL, DOS, PROBE,
and R2L, which covers the aforementioned 8 intrusion types.
For learning based IDSs, SVM and one typical DNN
architecture presented in [8] [37] are chosen as supervised
NID models. In the training process of DNN, the batch size
is initialized as 32 and the learning rate is adaptively decided.
Furthermore, dropout [35] and cross-validation are employed
to avoid over-fitting problems.
The evaluation stage is repeated 15 times. At each time,
6,000 and 12,000 normal requests are randomly selected for
training SVM and DNN, respectively. In addition, 50 fixed
samples of each type of intrusions are separately augmented to
500 by PGM and PGM-DGNNs associated DA module to 500.
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ML BASED 2-CLASS NID WITH LR AND SVM
(MEAN ± STD-DEV PERCENT)
Intrusion Type NID Model Name Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
’apache2’
NID-LR 98.51 ± 0.42 0.00 0.00 -
NID-DA-LR 99.53 ± 0.05 77.29 ± 1.21 90.70 ± 3.41 83.45 ± 2.14
NID-SVM 98.97 ± 0.02 55.73 ± 0.56 99.32 ± 0.38 71.39 ± 0.49
NID-DA-SVM 99.94 ± 0.01 95.61 ± 0.87 99.70 ± 0.07 97.61 ± 0.44
’mailbomb’
NID-LR 91.93 ± 0.44 0.00 0.00 -
NID-DA-LR 97.84 ± 0.41 78.11 ± 3.37 99.89 ± 0.14 87.63 ± 2.08
NID-SVM 93.04 ± 0.03 80.38 ± 1.58 11.53 ± 0.33 20.16 ± 0.50
NID-DA-SVM 99.34 ± 0.34 92.29 ± 3.65 99.78 ± 0.16 95.86 ± 2.05
’processtable’
NID-LR 99.33 ± 0.05 64.98 ± 1.78 98.74 ± 2.03 78.37 ± 1.72
NID-DA-LR 99.53 ± 0.04 72.46 ± 1.81 100.00 ± 0.00 84.02 ± 1.21
NID-SVM 99.87 ± 0.06 90.79 ± 3.86 99.60 ± 0.56 94.96 ± 2.14
NID-DA-SVM 99.90 ± 0.04 92.60 ± 2.17 99.71 ± 0.15 96.02 ± 1.22
’mscan’
NID-LR 97.78 ± 0.11 42.58 ± 1.35 84.90 ± 1.48 56.71 ± 1.42
NID-DA-LR 99.01 ± 0.06 64.81 ± 1.48 92.29 ± 0.46 76.14 ± 1.14
NID-SVM 99.61 ± 0.12 85.10 ± 4.34 94.11 ± 0.18 89.32 ± 2.73
NID-DA-SVM 99.73 ± 0.06 90.03 ± 4.12 95.12 ± 1.04 92.44 ± 1.65
’saint’
NID-LR 98.22 ± 0.22 40.17 ± 2.89 96.47 ± 1.45 56.65 ± 2.81
NID-DA-LR 98.47 ± 0.04 43.78 ± 0.75 96.93 ± 0.65 60.32 ± 0.83
NID-SVM 98.56 ± 0.03 45.39 ± 0.50 96.41 ± 0.75 61.72 ± 0.46
NID-DA-SVM 98.60 ± 0.01 46.08 ± 0.24 97.47 ± 0.33 62.58 ± 0.27
’guesspasswd’
NID-LR 88.59 ± 0.75 34.21 ± 1.50 75.10 ± 2.87 46.98 ± 1.44
NID-DA-LR 89.07 ± 0.24 35.65 ± 0.59 77.74 ± 0.19 48.89 ± 0.57
NID-SVM 94.59 ± 0.27 89.06 ± 1.93 22.21 ± 4.10 35.42 ± 5.19
NID-DA-SVM 98.95 ± 0.10 90.57 ± 2.17 94.29 ± 0.22 92.38 ± 1.19
’snmpgetattack’
NID-LR 88.67 ± 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
NID-DA-LR 80.42 ± 0.58 36.61 ± 0.69 99.43 ± 0.07 53.51 ± 0.72
NID-SVM 88.65 ± 0.02 0.00 0.00 -
NID-DA-SVM 82.42 ± 0.03 39.13 ± 0.03 99.39 ± 0.21 56.15 ± 0.04
’snmpguess’
NID-LR 98.84 ± 0.15 78.61 ± 2.51 95.93 ± 0.05 86.39 ± 1.55
NID-DA-LR 99.07 ± 0.06 82.66 ± 1.17 95.84 ± 0.00 88.76 ± 0.68
NID-SVM 96.18 ± 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
NID-DA-SVM 81.20 ± 0.04 16.85 ± 0.02 99.72 ± 0.10 28.83 ± 0.03
Overall, the augmented training set contains 4,000 intrusion
samples. At the completion of training, the deviant results
(e.g., extremely low F1-score) are rejected and the average
metrics are computed for the follow-up analysis.
Table IV and Table V present the comparison results of
multi-class NID using SVM and DNN, respectively. It can be
observed that the PGM-DGNNs enhanced NID frameworks
(named as NID-DA-SVM/DNN) outperforms other two NID
models with regard to both accuracy and F1-score.
For DNN based NID, the precision and recall obtained by
the proposed frameworks are better than, or comparable to
those obtained by other NID models. For SVM based NID,
it achieves the highest precision and recall on DOS with
notable exceptions on other three categories. The reason is that
network intrusion data generated by G-net are strictly affected
by DNN implemented D-net. As a result, augmented intrusion
features are more sensitive for DNN based NID models.
Despite that PGM enhanced IDSs have achieved improve-
ment on some evaluation metrics, those IDSs show undesired
performance (e.g., low F1-score on PROBE when DNN is
used) in identifying certain network intrusions. In contrast,
PGM-DGNNs aided NID frameworks are able to accurately
detect the intrusions with small and imbalanced samples.
V. DISCUSSION
The DA enhanced NID framework proposed in this paper
is trained in a data-driven manner. Its performance is closely
related to the quality of augmented network intrusions with re-
gard to the quantity and quality of known samples. Therefore,
the selected network intrusion samples are recommended to
be able to represent the underlying characteristics of relevant
intrusion types.
In the proposed NID framework, we have presented the
insight of using deep adversarial learning for augmenting
limited network intrusion samples. The structure of D-net and
G-net are generally formulated as fully connected DNNs, in
which advanced network architectures [28] might be employed
to design DGNNs.
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ML BASED 4-CLASS NID WITH SVM
(MEAN ± STD-DEV PERCENT)
Category NID Model Name Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
NORMAL
NID-SVM 76.30 ± 0.01 75.91 ± 0.01 98.69 ± 0.02 85.81 ± 0.01
NID-PGM-SVM 76.16 ± 0.08 75.90 ± 0.03 98.41 ± 0.11 85.70 ± 0.06
NID-DA-SVM 82.87 ± 0.17 98.39 ± 0.20 77.68 ± 0.32 86.82 ± 0.16
DOS
NID-SVM 94.00 ± 0.01 93.35 ± 1.15 25.34 ± 0.16 39.86 ± 0.10
NID-PGM-SVM 93.84 ± 0.10 86.98 ± 2.63 25.33 ± 0.49 39.23 ± 0.80
NID-DA-SVM 99.48 ± 0.05 94.09 ± 0.58 99.70 ± 0.06 96.81 ± 0.29
PROBE
NID-SVM 98.82 ± 0.02 68.54 ± 0.43 83.27 ± 0.53 75.19 ± 0.37
NID-PGM-SVM 98.80 ± 0.02 67.39 ± 0.31 85.89 ± 0.38 75.53 ± 0.30
NID-DA-SVM 99.32 ± 0.04 88.70 ± 0.88 78.13 ± 1.85 83.07 ± 1.00
R2L
NID-SVM 83.43 ± 0.01 97.91 ± 0.64 4.83 ± 0.02 9.20 ± 0.04
NID-PGM-SVM 83.34 ± 0.05 94.15 ± 5.15 4.51 ± 0.02 8.60 ± 0.04
NID-DA-SVM 83.74 ± 0.19 51.75 ± 0.31 96.57 ± 0.66 67.38 ± 0.23
TABLE V
DL BASED 4-CLASS NID WITH DNN
(MEAN ± STD-DEV PERCENT)
Category NID Model Name Accuracy Precision Recall F1-Score
NORMAL
NID-DNN 77.15 ± 3.22 76.5 ± 2.81 99.15 ± 0.51 86.33 ± 1.64
NID-PGM-DNN 83.17 ± 1.40 81.58 ± 1.31 99.26 ± 0.37 89.55 ± 0.76
NID-DA-DNN 87.96 ± 0.12 86.95 ± 0.28 98.15 ± 0.61 92.21 ± 0.11
DOS
NID-DNN 93.81 ± 2.94 89.70 ± 6.58 23.55 ± 9.17 27.72 ± 7.37
NID-PGM-DNN 99.04 ± 0.22 97.84 ± 3.73 89.97 ± 0.98 93.7 ± 1.34
NID-DA-DNN 99.59 ± 0.08 97.14 ± 1.36 97.65 ± 0.40 97.39 ± 0.52
PROBE
NID-DNN 98.92 ± 0.31 74.54 ± 1.93 81.49 ± 8.26 76.79 ± 3.29
NID-PGM-DNN 98.40 ± 0.07 64.93 ± 1.90 55.84 ± 7.72 59.78 ± 3.86
NID-DA-DNN 99.05 ± 0.07 75.27 ± 1.24 83.47 ± 4.52 79.11 ± 2.17
R2L
NID-DNN 83.90 ± 2.72 58.99 ± 3.87 7.55 ± 5.81 11.28 ± 3.13
NID-PGM-DNN 84.90 ± 1.26 88.45 ± 5.67 13.92 ± 7.48 23.60 ± 2.57
NID-DA-DNN 89.09 ± 0.10 92.17 ± 4.86 40.97 ± 1.82 56.64 ± 0.92
The computational complexity of the proposed NID frame-
work includes the following two phases. In the testing phase,
classifying over 80,000 network data takes a few seconds even
if DNN is applied. In the training phase, time consumption
can be analyzed as follows. First, PGM simulates synthesised
intrusion data within minutes by using MCMC based Gibbs
sampling. Second, DGNNs is efficiently optimized on high
performance computing devices. In our experiments, training
the DGNNs on NVIDIA GTX 1080 GPU takes less than two
hours. Third, training supervised classifiers (i.e., SVM and
DNN) requires less than half an hour. In spite of the training
time, it demonstrates high efficiency in identifying network
intrusions, which is necessary in network security.
The proposed DA module can be alternatively applied to
assist NID algorithms implemented on distributed platforms.
Specifically, the imbalanced training set is firstly augmented
with the proposed DA module in a data center. The augmented
dataset can then be partitioned into several data blocks, in
which normal network request data and network intrusion
samples have comparable proportions. Finally, those balanced
data blocks are delivered to different computing nodes to
distributively train NID models.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a general NID framework and two learning
based data augmentation components have been jointly pro-
posed to tackle the data scarcity and data imbalance problem
in designing learning based IDSs. In this framework, statistic
learning based PGM and deep learning based DGNNs of
DA module are developed for enlarging limited intrusion
samples in the training set. By employing classical ML models
(e.g., LR and SVM) as well as advanced DNNs, it can
accurately classify normal network request and heterogeneous
network intrusions. Extensive experimental validations have
been conducted on KDD Cup 99 dataset. Both binary and
multiple classification results have shown that the DA en-
hanced IDSs outperform others regarding F1-score (which is a
crucial criterion of evaluating imbalanced classification tasks).
Additionally, it achieves improved or comparable accuracy,
precision and recall, especially when DNN is adopted for
classifying network data.
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